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Abstract-Against the problems emerged in protocols presented
by N. Modadugu, D.Bonch and M. Kim I1l, news server-
aided public key generation protocols on low-power devices are
proposed in this paper. The protocols are secure against some
passive attacks, such as "collusion attack" and "the third party
attack". In addition, efficiency of primality test on low-power
devices in reference [1] is improved in this paper. Prospective
applications of the protocols would be found in mobile e-
commence, mobile Ad-hoc, and military communications.
I. INTRODCTJION
As a new application for in-vehicle entertainiment, MP3
players have begun to make an entrance into the vehicle
market. Connections compatible with suchlike devices
(MP3) have been available on BMW, Nissan, Volvo, and
so on. The logical extension of this trend is in-vehicle hard
drivers and wireless local area networks (WLANs), which
would permit the information exchange among home,
office and vehicle via wireless connections the storage
and transfer of every sort of computer files such as
databases, documents, music files, video files, and
entertainments. Consumers would not drive to a video
store to rent a movie, but would merely download the
movie file via wireless connection from a convenient
location-perhaps a metro station-and also pay in mobile
devices such as mobile set, PDA, and other handheld
devices, via the wireless connection. Most of these
applications require secure means of communication such as
encryption, authentication or digital signature schemes to
perform their tasks without compromising confidentiality or
authenticity. Generally, public key cryptosystems, such as
RSA, or distribution system, such as Diffie-Hellman(D-H)
algorithm, is absolutely necessary for realizing such schemes.
Most of public key cryptosystems or distribution system deals
with modular exponentiation over finite field. To construct
such systems, one usually needs to generate large primes.
However, this cauLses a large amount of comptutations due to a
computationally heav pnimality test algoritlhn.
Imitially, the public key was generated by a trusted server or
a key management centre, and then issued to a low-power
device offline. In Ad-hoc networks, however, there is no key
managemeint centre. Users (include low-power device holders)
freely access in and out of the networks, they have to
generate their own key on their own device. The most
expensive time consuming computation in public key
generation, for not onlly RSA but public key systems else such
as ElGamal, DSA and D-H, is prime search. For low-power
devices with only limited computational resources, the
workload may be very heavy. As an example, it was reported
that the generation of a 1024-bit RSA key took about 15
minutes on the PanIPilot [2].
N. Modadugu, D.Boneh and M. Kim [1] resolved the
problem by presenting two-server-aided RSA key generation
protocols. which we call "MIBK". Using the MK protocols,
users can quickly generate an RSA key on a low-power
device with the help of un-trsted servers in such a way that
once the key is generated the server should not get an
information about the key it helped generation. However, one
drawback of the MBK protocols is that two servers involved
in generation of RSA key must not share information with
each other. Otherwise, they can easily acquire die user's
secret key from share information as noted in [1].
In this paper, we present new version of the MBK protocols
that resists a "collusion attack"' in which the two servers in the
server-aided public key generion collude to shlae
information. Our protocols can also protect the low-power
device users from "the third party ttack" in which an
eavesdropper hijacks all of the infonnation of the user. We
take RSA for example buit not limit to RSA. The New
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protocols are suitable for those systems based on modular
exponentiation over finite field. Besides, our solution is
almost as efficient as the original MIK protocols on low-
power device and hence can be widely used in practice.
II. OVERVIEW OF RSA KEY GENERATION
In this section we give a brief overview of the RSA key
generation. As a result of the RSA key generation, a key iNo,
eC,dT+-can be generated. Here N½) pqodenotes an it-bit
modulus, where pand qpare two large primes, each of Which
is : bits long. e denotes the public exponent and d½denotes
the pnrvate exponent. A high-level description of the RSA key
generation algonithm is as follows.
1) Repeat the following steps until two primes pland qkare
found:
(a) Pick a random 512-bit candidate value poor q.
(b) Check that p½is not divisible by any small primes (i e.
2,3,5,7, et.) using trial division.
(c) Pick g E [2, p - 1] <at random and check whether
9 I i'ao pI & 1IA nidqo
holds or not. (Note that all pnrmes will pass this test
while composites will fail with overwhelming
probability).
2) Compute Ny pq.
3) Pick encryption and decryption exponents eoand d(bsuch
that ed - 1 (mod y(V)) 3 where (0(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)
(Note that (0 <denotes the Euler function).
In the above algorithm, the most resource-consuming
operations occur in Step l(c), which is the primality testing
part. Compared with 1(c), computational overhead for
conducting Step 2 and Step 3 are small. We remark that when
RSA cryptosystem is uised to encrypt a short session key (for
a smmetry encryption scheme), which is shorter than the bit-
length of p, one can use the "unbalanced RSA", firstly
considered by Shamir [3]. In his unbalanced RSA, the
encryption and decryption exponent c< and do satisfy
ed 1 mod (p -1)) and the size of a prime factor qomis
approximately 10 times larger than the other prime factor p.
Shamir [3] noted that the key generation of the standard RSA
can be sped up 'm the unbalanced version without extra tine
complexity. In [1], N. Modadugu et al. present a -variant of the
unbalanced RSA xvhere a modulus is a product of a prime and
a certain size of random number. It is evident that in this
variant, the computations in Step 1(c) can be greatly reduced
due to the fact that only one prime needs to be generated. (As
a result, the RSA key generation in [2] can be sped up ftther).
III. THE MBK PROTOCOLS
In this section we review the MBK protocols for standard
and unbalanced RSA key generation.
A. StandardRSA key generation
The mami idea of MBK protocol to generate a standard
RSA modulus is to divide quarter of candidate
() V p4q1 into two parts: t, and t2 such that4 4
t1 + t (2=L and then ask two um-trused servers for
assistance to generate key. We describe the protocol as
follows
1) Low-power device generates two candidates pyand qp
such that p _q 3((mod4) , each of them is L -bit in2
length: and none of them is divisible by small primes.
2) Low-power device computes N pq and Q(NV)N-p-
q+1. At the moment, Q (N) is just a candidate, not an
ELuler number. Then pick a random g E Z4 such that g is
not a multiple o6fp or q.
3) Low-power device picks random integers t; and t
in (-N,N) such that t(+t2 Av) .Then the low-power device4
sends <N, gt1> to serxTer 1 and <N, gjt> to serxTer 2
respectively.
4) Server 1 calculates X1 -gt (modN) and server 2,
x _=g'2 (mod N) separately. Both results are sent back
to low-power device.
5) Low-power device judges if N is a potential RSA
modulus or not by checking X1 +X2 (mod N).
6) Low-power device locally rums a probabilistic primality
test once to NTerify that severs retured correct values. [1]
B. UnbalancedRSA key neration
So-called unbalanced RSA mneans that RSA modulus is a
product of a prune p and a random nwnber or a longer prime
which is 8-10 limes long as the prime p in bits.
The main idea of the MBK protocol for unbalanced RSA is
similar to that for standard RSA. The differences ae: (a)
Low-power device divides (p-i) (not )into two parts
such that t + t2 = p -1 (b) The low-power device checks if
X1 - +X2 (mod p) (The modulus is not N).
In the above protocol, the total ruining tune is reduced by a
factor of 5 [1]. Here, it is worth emphasizing that an
unbalanced RSA is only suitable for the case xvhen the size of
a plain-text is smaller thain that of prine p. Besides, the
unbalanced RSA key can only be used for encryption. It
canot be used for signature.
IV. COUNTERMEATURES: TWO NEW SERVER-AIDED
RSA KEY GENERATION PROTOCOLS SECURE
AGAINST SOME PASSIVE ATTACKS
Recall that im MBK protocols, a- low powert device-
generates its-Owil key with the help of- two un-trusted
serversg without compromising the- securityv of- the key if
and only if the- servers cannot excha,nge- intorniation withn
each- other.- Actually, it is very difficult to isolate two
servers over pubie networks. Onee- two key generation
serTers collude, it is easy for them to obtain the hand-held
deice's private key. More precisely, if the two servers
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exchang;etI1and t2in the standard RSA version of the MBK
protocol, they can easily recover (N) by simply
computing y(N) = 4(t4 + t2). Furtliemore, they figure out the
user'sprivate key d)from o(N) and public key eby
runnmg the Euclidean algorithm [5] to get
d e -1 (mod 9o(N)). Moreover, in mobile communication
environment, it is possible for an eavesdropper to hijack all of
the information between the low-power device and the servers
involved in computation. Hence the eavesdropper can figure
out the user's private key from the intercepted infom ation. In
this section, we present two new server-aided RSA key
generation protocols secure against the above passive attacks.
A. SandardRSA ky generation protocol secure against
passive attack
A standard RSA key generation version of the niew protocol
can be described as follows:
1) Low-power device generates two candidates p)and qVJ
such that p E q E 3 (mod4), each of them is -bit im2
length, and none ofthem is divisible by small primes.
2) Low-power device computes N pq and 9(N) N-p-
q+1, where ( N) is j'ust a caindidate, not an Euler number.
Then pick a random g E ZA such that g is not a multiple
ofp or q.
3) Low-power device picks random integers ti , t, and
t2,r t2 in(NAt) suchi tat
t +t1 t +t1 4)I 1 2 -, 4 (2)
4) Low-power device picks random integers k. / and large
numbers a and b in (0. (N)) such that
gcd(a, ((N)) = 1, gcd(b, 9p(N)) = 1 (3)
Then compute
N:ow we verify the soumdness of the above protocol.
For all g E (-N, N) and gcd(g, N) = 1, according
to Euler theory
gy) = (modN)





<1 -+g (modN) (8)
Equation (3) reads that a is an odd, hence
gati -at2 (modN) (9)
According to number theory; we get folloxving formulae
from Equations (8) and (9) respectively
gtl -+g-t2modp) (10)
gatl _±g at2(modp) (11)
Combine step 6), part A section IV NiNth Equation (11),
xve have
A1_ g'Si g [a+k(p-1)]tl g at g k(p-1)tl at,
_i± -at2 _ +g s2 _ +X 2 moa +g' 2 (m d p)
Where
(12)
(gP -I) kj 1: (mod p) (13)
The current problem is whether or not Eqation (10) holds
when Equation (12) is true?
Let j a-1 (mod (p -1)) 3 consider precondition
gcd(a, y(N)) 1, and raise both sides of Equation (11) toj,
then
(g atl )j (gaa 1t ) _+(gat2 )J aa+(g 't2) (mop)
Where gaa g (mod p). It follows that
g 1 -+g t2 (odp)
(14)
(4) Similarly; xve get
= [b + l(q - 1)]t S -bt (5)
5) Low-power device sends <I N, g, sls > to server 1
and < N,gs,2,S2 > to serer 2
6) Server 1 computes XI - g'1 (mod N) and
_ g' (modN) . Server 2 computes X2 g'2 (mod N)
and X _ g- (mod N) . All of the results are sent back to
the low-power device.
7) Low-power deNice checks if X_1 ±X- (mod p)3 and
N =+±Xf (modq). If so, p and q are consideed to be
potential primes. Then, N pq is declared as a potential RSA
modutlus. Otherwise, restart the operaitions from step P).
8) Low-power device locally runs a probabilistic promalty
test with a small Mersenne prime Mn to verif that severs
retunmed correct values.
X1 2X' (mod q) (15)
On the other hand, if poor q)is not a prime, Equation (7)
will fail with os erwhelmmg probability. Consequently,
Equations (12) and (15) will fail with overwhelming
probability.
B. Unbalanced RSA ke generation protocol swcure against
passive atttck
We describe the unbalanced RSA key generation protocol
against passive attack as follows
1) Low-power device generates a 512-bit candidate p such
that p _ 3(mod 4) and p is not divisible by small primes
and a random number R that is 8-10 limes long as p in bits,
usually 4096-bit. Then compute v = pR
2) Low-power device picks a random integers t, and tF
m (-p p) such+ hat tn = 1 pick random integers
a, kin (0, N) sudh that
gcd(a, p- 1) 1 (16)
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SI [a + k(p 1)]tl, - -at,I S2 Z
Then compute s1 =[a + k(p -l)]t1, s2 =-at2
3 Low-power device picks a random number g e ZA
such that g is not multiple either p or q. Then the device sends
g,gs1> to server 1 and <N g,s2> to ser-er 2
4} Server 1 computes XI g' i(mod N) , server 2
computes N2 =g<2 (mod N). Both results are senit back to
low-power device.
5) Low-power device checks if N1 +X2 (modp). If
so, N - pR is declared as a potential unbalanced RSA
modulus. Otherwise, restart from step 1)
6) Low-power device locally runs a probabilistic primality
test to verify thatp is a prime.
In this version, the total runing time is reduced by a factor
of 5 [4]. It is xworth noticing that untbalanced RSA is only
suitable for the case that message is shorter than p. Besides,
the version canot be used for signatures.
C Scuriy ana{vsis
Analysis in [1] showed that the un-trusted servers learnt no
useful information about RSA private key whether from the
rejected candidates or from the finial public key if only server
1 did not collude with server 2. So is the case im our protocols.
Also in our protocols, the un-trusted servers shall not get any
useful information even if they share information with each
other.
In the standard version of new protocol, server 1 learns
only s1 and s1, server 2 knows only s and s' They
are not able to figure out t, and t2 from sI and
s. because they do not know a, k, and prime p, or b, 1, prime
q. Suppose the two servers collude and calctulate
4(s1 -s2) = (p -l)[a(q - 1) + 4kt1 ], (17)
the un-trusted servers have to factorize great composite if they
want to derive (p - 1) from equation (17). As we know, it
is comnputationally infeasible as long as the integer is greater
than 576 bits [4]. Similarly, there is no way for them to figure
out(q-1) from Sand s-, Hence the servers are not able
to get y(N). In result, the servers shall know nothimg about
user's private key even if they could share information with
one anothea.
It is also impossible for any attacker to get p or q or y(N)
by random gLuessing when N, s, and s2 are large enoough
Therefore, users are able to generate RSA ke with the
assistance of two un-trusted servers on loxv-power device
against some passis e attacks, such as "collusion attack" and
"the third party attack", in our new protocols.
With a similar argument, the unbalanced RSA version of
our protocol can be proven to be secure against some passive
attacks
It is the very reason that ve can do simgle server-aided key
generation without extra work added on low-power device.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We substitute random number g with small Mersenne
prime m to do the primality test n otur protocols. Tfhe reasons
are: (a) Small Merseune prime must satisfy gcd(mr,,MN) 1.
(b) Multiplication by m can be substituted with simply shift
and addition. It is obVious that the primality test in our
approaches is faster than that in: MBK protocols.
The MBK protocols efficiently solved the problem of RSA
key generation on a low-power device with the help of two
un-trusted servers. However, the protocols are insecure
against collusion attack and eavesdrop.
In this paper, we present new protocols in Which the
problem of some passive attacks are successfully solved by
hidinig useful iMformation tI , t and 92 / ,respectively
behind s1 s1 and s2, s' .
There are small works added to a low-power device in otu
protocols. For legal user, it is easy to check the validity of the
canididates. For malicious servers or the third party attackers,
they must factorize very large composite if they want to filch
user's private information.
Another merit is that the new protocols are also suitable
for the applications of single server-aided key generation
without causing extra workload on low-power device. Note
that as in discussed in [6], computiing power of low-power
device is much smaller than that of servers. From this point of
view, our protocols are preferable to the MBK protocols for
single server-aided key generation case, in which low-power
device must compute modular exponentiation g r (mod N)
Or g r (mod ) where r is 160 bits long integer.
In addition, the holder of a low-power device need not
worry about eavesdroppi on network from the thfird party.
While using the MBK protocols, we must make special
protection measure between low-power device and server in
order to protect an eavesdropper from overhearing.
However, large amount of work are added to server 1 and
2, the length of exponent dominates the speed of key
generation. Ih NBK protocols, exponents t, andt are similar
length to y(N) while s1 and s2 are much longer than4
that of (0(N) in the new protocol, the maximlum length can
reach nearly two times of (0(N)'s. that may slow down the
work=mg speed one multiple [2]. In other words, we acquire
securit key generaton in the cost of working speed of the
servers. Nevertheless it is still much faster than local
generation on low-power device according to reference[4].
Of course, we should take notice when we chose
paraineters of unbalanced RSA key [3].
We take RSA for example of server-aided key generation
on lov-power device, but not limnit to RSA. The approach is
also suitable for those public key systems based on modular
expoientiation over fmite field such as DSA, D-H, ElGahnal,
and so on.
VI. OPEN PROBLEM
It remains an open question. eter there is any waylse
to break ou protocols?
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